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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No: 03-3897
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHARLES STUBBS,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 99-cr-00175-1)
District Judge: CHIEF JUDGE, DONETTA W. AMBROSE
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 22, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, McKEE and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 9, 2004)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Charles Stubbs appeals his conviction for violating of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(“felon in possession”).  He argues that the district court’s jury instructions were
erroneous, and that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to
him.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.
     1The relevant language of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) is:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person- -
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
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I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Charles Stubbs and two others were charged with various crimes in connection
with an October 7, 1999 bank robbery.  The charges included: conspiracy, bank robbery,
armed bank robbery, carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a
felon in possession of a firearm.  Stubbs was originally convicted of all charges, but we
thereafter vacated his convictions and remanded for a new trial. See United States v.
Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002).  On remand, Stubbs was once again convicted of all
charges, and this appeal followed. 
He now challenges only his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as
charged in Count V.  In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the
government must prove (1) that Stubbs has a prior felony conviction for a crime
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, (2) that he possessed a firearm, and
(3) that the firearm had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.1  Stubbs claims that
the jury instruction was erroneous, and that the evidence was insufficient to establish the
required nexus to interstate commerce.  
     2There are two guns at issue in this case.  They were manufactured in California and
Connecticut.  Stubbs argues that this only proves the place of manufacturer and not that
they traveled in interstate commerce as required by 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
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The government sought to establish the interstate commerce element through
uncontested testimony that the guns in question were manufactured in Connecticut and
California. The court charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows:
Members of the jury, I’m sure that you understand, in arriving at your decision on
the charges of felon in possession, you are permitted to use all the evidence and all
the instructions that you have previously received, in addition to the following
instruction which specifically applies to the crime of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon to be established, the government must prove all the elements
beyond a reasonable doubt.
That the defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year;
That the defendant thereafter possessed a firearm; and that said firearm was 
possessed in or affecting interstate commerce.
II.  DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Stubbs first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under
18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), because the government only proved the guns were manufactured
outside of Pennsylvania.2 Stubbs contends that out-of-state manufacture before he
possessed the guns in Pennsylvania is insufficient to establish the interstate commerce
element of the offense.  
We review the "sufficiency of the evidence  . . .  in a light most favorable to the
Government following a jury verdict in its favor."  See United States v. Gambone, 314
4F.3d 163, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 260 (3d Cir.
2001) and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)).  “We must sustain the
verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, to uphold the jury's decision . . .  We do not weigh evidence or determine the
credibility of witnesses in making this determination.”  Id. (citing United States v.
Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2000).
Although Stubbs attempts to claim that out-of-state manufacture does not establish
travel in interstate commerce, it is now well established that “proof that the possessed
firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce [is] sufficient to satisfy the. . . []
‘in commerce or affecting commerce’[] nexus requirement.” United States v. Gateward,
84 F.3d 670, 671 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 573 
(1997)).  
Stubbs relies primarily upon United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3rd Cir.
2001) for his argument to the contrary.   There, we applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Scarborough in holding “proof . . . that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at
some point in the past, [is] sufficient to satisfy the interstate element.”  Id. at 205.   Stubbs
claims that Singletary therefore requires direct or “specific testimonial evidence of, or
stipulation to, the gun’s post-manufacture travel through interstate commerce.”  (Brief at
30).  However, this precise requirement exists nowhere in Singletary.  It is uncontested
that the two guns Stubbs possessed were manufactured in Connecticut and California and
that Stubbs possessed them here in Pennsylvania.  The district court correctly noted that
     3 They clearly did not undergo some kind of quantum state fluctuation and then
materialize out of the ethers here in Pennsylvania without traversing the space between
Pennsylvania and the states of manufacture.
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they got here somehow and they could not have done so without traveling in interstate
commerce.3 
Here, as in Singletary, the guns in question were manufactured outside of
Pennsylvania.  Therefore, the jury could conclude that the guns traveled in interstate
commerce to get here.  Indeed, the jury could conclude nothing else.
B.  Jury Instructions
Stubbs next argues that the jury instruction pertaining to § 922(g) was erroneous
because the trial judge failed to define “interstate commerce.”  Stubbs reasons that the
meaning of “interstate commerce,” is not commonly understood by lay persons. However,
Stubbs did not object to the charge at trial, and we therefore review the instruction for
plain error.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).  In order to prevail under a
plain error analysis there has to be an “error,” that is “plain” and “affects substantial
rights.”  Id. at 732.  An error is plain when it is “obvious” or “clear.”  Id. at 734.  To
“affect[] substantial rights” the error must have “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.”  Id.    Furthermore, Stubbs must demonstrate that any such error was
prejudicial.  Id. at 735.  If Stubbs can satisfy his burden and establish plain error we have
authority to correct it, “but [we are] not required to do so.”  Id.   
Even if we assume that the trial court erred by not defining “interstate commerce,”
6it is clear that the error was not prejudicial and therefore did not affect the outcome of this
case.  It is fair to assume that most people understand what is meant by “interstate
commerce,” and it is impossible for us to conclude that defining that term for the jury
would have altered the outcome given the place of manufacture.
Therefore, Stubbs can not establish plain error.
C.  Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)
Stubbs’ final argument is a challenge to the constitutionality of §922(g)(1). 
However, we have already rejected that claim in Singletary, 268 F.3d at 205, and will not
now revisit that ruling.  See, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1. 
III.  Conclusion
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
                          
